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INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: A CASE-
BASED COMPARISON BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Leentje Volker1, and Timothy M. Rose2  
ABSTRACT 
Despite a general belief that incentive mechanisms can improve value for money during 
procurement and performance during project execution, empirical research on the actual effects 
is nascent. This research focuses on the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms in 
four different infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two 
building constructions in Australia. Based on an analytical framework of key motivation drivers, 
a cross cases analysis is conducted in view of performance on the contract assumptions, selection 
phase, execution phase and project contract performance.  
It was identified that despite significant differences in the project characteristics, results 
indicate that they experience similar contextual drivers on the incentive effectiveness. High value 
was placed on risk allocation and relationship building in the selection and construction phase. 
The differences can be explained from both contextual and project related characteristics. 
Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of 
case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the nature of incentive systems across 
different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.  
 
KEYWORDS: incentives, collaboration, infrastructure projects, Australia, the Netherlands, 
project performance 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a general belief that incentive mechanisms can improve value for money during 
procurement and performance during project execution, empirical research supporting this is 
limited (Verma, Mitnick and Marcus 1999, Rose and Manley 2011). Strikingly, Bresnen and 
Marshall (2000) state that “the prospect that it may be possible to ‘engineer’ collaboration and 
trust through ‘formal’ mechanisms, such as team-building and incentives systems, has led to a 
profusion of reports and manuals aimed at providing practitioners extensive guidelines for ‘best 
practice’ in partnering or alliancing”.  
The ability of an incentive mechanism to encourage collaboration and the formation of 
trust is driven by the intention of the formal reward to promote effort towards high level 
performance goals. This can potentially be achieved by having reward recipients share in the 
client’s success from the project in a wide range of performance areas such as cost containment, 
schedule performance and quality of workmanship. However, the effectiveness of an incentive 
mechanism to promote effort towards client goals is highly sensitive to the context in which it is 
applied (Bresnen and Marshall 2000). Thus, if an incentive mechanism is not carefully designed 
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to suit its context, it may induce undesired behavior, inhibiting the formation of the trust and 
cooperation.  
A key challenge faced by incentive designers is to align formal incentive mechanisms 
with informal governance arrangements in a complimentary way. This challenge is compounded 
by the complex nature of the construction supply chain, where production is fragmented 
(Mitropoulos and Tatum 2000) and typically characterized by disjointed relationships between 
contracting parties (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2004). The unique multi-firm production model 
used on construction projects can result in difficulty in assessing performance where project 
teams are highly interdependent i.e. individual output is difficult to distinguish from group 
output. Under these conditions, motivation toward incentive goals need to be encouraged at both 
personal and organizational levels, but also across a highly interdependent, but contractually 
fragmented project team (Rose and Manley 2011). 
Furthermore, incentive systems have both a social and a contractual component that 
influences their effectiveness. In terms of the project delivery process, the procurement phase 
mainly focuses on the legal establishment of a collaborative agreement while the execution phase 
has an evaluative character about the results of the collaboration. By negotiation in the 
procurement phase, the client intends to steer the direction of the results. However, these results 
need to be acceptable from both sides to effectively encourage positive motivation towards client 
goals. 
In light of the need to consider contextual drivers, common lessons may be derived from 
comparing the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms across different delivery 
strategies and environmental contexts. Comparative analysis provides guidance for improving 
the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms to promote improved project performance. Therefore, 
the research presented in this paper addresses the actual design and implementation of incentive 
mechanisms in infrastructure projects and compares these characteristics to derive similarities 
and differences across the Australian and Dutch contexts.  
Firstly, the context of public construction projects and the characteristics of incentive 
mechanisms are explained. Secondly, a comparative study of four cases project studies is 
reported. The research identifies several differences between the Australian and the Dutch 
context but also shows similarities in the success or failure of incentives, contributing to the 
knowledge of how incentives should be designed and implemented to encourage improved 
project performance. To build on these exploratory findings, future research is recommended.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The nature of incentive mechanisms 
At a fundamental level, construction incentives aim to increase the motivation and 
commitment of project stakeholder and the ability of an incentive to induce motivation are 
founded on principles of work motivation theories. Work motivation can be defined as a set of 
external and internal energetic forces that initiate work-related behavior and determine its form, 
intensity, direction and duration. Reward systems such incentives affect motivation, which in 
turn determines effort and ultimately impacts on performance (Van Herpen, Van Praag and 
Cools 2002). 
Although there are a wide range of motivation theories, three key theoretical constructs 
are argued to usefully inform the nature of incentive mechanisms on construction projects. They 
comprise goal commitment, justice and social preferences/reciprocity theory (Rose 2008).  
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• Goal commitment: As an extension to goal-setting, goal commitment (Hollenbeck and Klein 
1987) refers to the sustained determination and motivation to try for an incentive goal – 
suggesting the way the goals of an incentive are managed over time will impact motivation 
and commitment. Key antecedents of goal commitment are those that impact on the 
attractiveness of goal attainment and those that impact on the expectancy of goal attainment 
(Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).  
• Justice: The perception of fairness (or justice) regarding how and what decisions are made 
about reward systems can significantly affect motivation toward reward goals. There are two 
key justice theories relating to the fairness of decision outcomes or distributive justice and 
more recent work focusing on justice of the decision-making processes that lead to decision 
outcomes, or what is termed as procedural justice (Colquitt 2004). A third theory, 
complimentary to distributive and procedural justice, is interactional justice relating to 
aspects of the communication process between reward providers and recipients, such as 
honesty and respect. Interactional justice indicates that the propriety of behavior will 
significantly impact on motivation. Thus, the quality of the relationship between project 
participants impacts on perception of incentive fairness.  
• Social preferences/reciprocity: Similar to interaction justice, economic reciprocity theory 
states contract agents prefer a condition of fairness in their exchange relationship. Depending 
on shared behavior, the value of a financial reward can be perceived to be positive or 
negative. Thus, if the incentive’s intention is perceived to be as ‘calculative’ or hostile, 
parties may view the incentive negatively, which can lead to a hostile response (Fehr and 
Falk 2002).  
Incentives in construction projects 
Incentive mechanisms have the potential to improve performance within a construction 
project if implemented correctly and can be introduced into any construction project contract 
(Bower et al. 2002). Incentives are generally applied to promote motivation to achieve client-
specified project goals by offering either a profit sharing arrangement or a performance bonus to 
contract agents for above minimum performance standards. Bower et al. (2002) distinguish three 
main types of incentives in construction: share of cost saving incentives between client and 
contractor, schedule incentive with a premium for early completion, and technical performance 
bonuses for meeting other performance targets, such as quality and functionality. The general 
principles upon which incentive systems should be based include the need to ensure that risks 
and rewards are commensurably and fairly distributed among the parties concerned and that they 
are tailored to specific project objectives (Bresnen and Marshall 2000).  
In a recent mixed method study, Meng and Gallagher (2012) found that time incentives 
are common practice in public sector projects. Fixed price contracts perform better on cost 
certainty and completion on budget than target costs, final outcome based payment and cost plus 
fee contracts. The use of incentives aligns the contractor’s objective with the client’s 
expectations in a project and ensures that contractors pay attention to the issues that are 
important for the client. Commonly, positive project performance incentives are used along with 
disincentives (penalties). However, it is argued that, to ensure that an adversarial relationship 
does not occur between the contracting parties, the incentive systems should focus on positive 
incentives, rather than penalties (Lahdenpera and Koppinen 2003, Rose and Manley 2011). Yet, 
it is generally accepted within the incentive literature that the use of multiple positive incentives 
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can improve overall performance while a single incentive tends to stimulate performance of 
particular aspect.  
A multiple incentive approach suits a construction project context where there are high 
levels of interdependence, i.e. many project parties contribute to overall performance targets. 
Also, a multiple incentive approach can minimize imbalance in the contract agent priorities, for 
example, emphasis on target cost outcomes at the potential detriment of quality outcomes (Arditi 
and Yasamis 1998, Rose and Manley 2010). 
Influence on project performance 
The use of risk/reward models and shared project risks provides an important impetus for 
improved project performance. In the construction industry project success is often measured by 
all or a few of the aspects of cost, time, quality, environmental impact, work environment and 
innovation (Doloi, Iyer and Sawhney 2011, Eriksson and Westerberg 2011). In defining above 
minimum performance standards it is important to understand how project performance is 
determined in a construction project context.  
Project success can be affected by several aspects. Based on a literature review Eriksson 
& Westerberg (2011) claim that collaboration between parties is enhanced by the mediating role 
of joint specification, selected tendering, soft parameters in bid evaluation, joint subcontractor 
selection, incentive based payment, collaborative tools and contractors self-control in the 
procurement phase. According to Tabish and Neeray Jah (2011) the most significant factor for 
overall project performance in a public context is awareness of and compliance with rules and 
regulations. Pre-project planning and clarity in scope, effective partnering and external 
monitoring and control were also identified as success factors. Love, Mistry and Davis (2010) 
found based on interviews that trust, adequate resources, open communication, coordination, 
integration of top management support, creativity, and good alignments were the critical success 
factors for all stages of price competitive project alliances in Western Australia. Their study 
revealed that “the nature of the price competition model may lead to suboptimal solutions if the 
target outturn cost is used as a mechanism to simply win the contract” (Love, Mistry and Davis 
2010: 955).  
In light of theoretical constructs that underpin the design and implementation of incentive 
mechanisms, there are a wide range of options that can be applied to a construction project, 
where suitability of a specific option is context dependent. According to work motivation theory, 
Rose & Manley (2008, 2011) identified key financial incentive design requirements in 
construction that incorporate: 1) flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over 
time, 2) multiple goals covering different project areas, and 3) distribution of rewards and a 
valued reward level across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. 
potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants, individually and as a 
team). Additionally, financial incentive mechanism benefits are maximized through equitable 
contract risk allocation, early contractor involvement in design, value-driven tender selection, 
relationship workshops, and future work opportunities. 
In summary, incentive reward mechanisms should be fairly applied so that rewards and 
measurement processes illicit their desired behaviors. These shared behaviors can heavily 
influence the establishment of trust and trustworthiness in ongoing project exchanges, with a 
notable predication that project participants will be more likely to cooperate voluntarily and 
reciprocate positive behavior if they jointly perceive an incentive mechanisms intention is fair 
and honorable. Multiple incentives mechanisms, value-driven tender, open communication, 
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equitable risk allocation and external monitoring and control are important ingredients for a 
successful incentive based project.  
METHODS  
Despite the broad appliance of incentive mechanisms, empirical research on the actual 
effects is nascent. Next to that, contractual and actual cost data are sensitive and delicate by 
nature and gaining access to the essential information proved to be difficult. Case studies were 
seen as the best method given the complexity of project environments, and the need for in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics surrounding project-based motivation in order to effectively 
scope and identify project drivers. A qualitative multiple case study approach could enable 
discovering of patterns between the incentive mechanisms and project characteristics. Four case 
projects were deemed sufficient to derive cross-case conclusions. This number falls within the 
optimal range recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009) of between four and ten cases. 
With fewer than four case studies, the empirical grounding of the research is likely to be 
unconvincing and with more than ten cases it can be very difficult to manage the complexity and 
volume of data. 
The cases were considered as a rich empirical description of the particular social entities 
as occurring in infrastructure projects. Case studies are typically based on a variety of data 
sources (Easton 2010) and answer research questions that address ‘how’ and ‘why’ particularly 
well in unexplored research areas (Edmondson and Mcmanus 2007). Using several data sources 
in a particular case situation is an increasingly popular research method for studying complex 
organizational and business processes in construction, as for example recently illustrated by 
Hartmann and Bresnen (2011) on studying the transformation of partnering processes of public 
clients. Considering the complexity of the relation between incentive mechanisms and project 
performances, a cross case approach also suits our research aims.  
In this paper a comparison is made of the incentive mechanisms of four integrated Design 
and Build cases in public infrastructure: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two 
building constructions in Australia. We selected cases from countries that are both known for 
their innovative market approach and high quality standard project deliveries. For this study each 
of the authors selected two cases that were collected in their country of origin in the context of 
independent research projects (Rose 2008, Scharpff et al. forthcoming). The selection of the 
cases can be considered as revelatory since they originate from a different research context and 
types of infrastructure. Yet, all four cases share the same innovative and incentive based 
character. This provided a rich data set to compare and contrast the differences in project types 
and the nature of project delivery across the cases, while maintaining the character of the 
incentive system relatively constant. 
 
Most of the data was collected by interviews. After some general questions about the 
project characteristics and the outcomes, the interviews focused on the issue of goal 
commitment, distributive justice, process fairness and interactional justice as important 
motivation drivers. Examples of interview questions are: “Did you see value in the achievement 
of the incentive goal?”, “Was the incentive amount appropriate in terms of risks?”, and “Did you 
have influence over the outcome arrived by the incentive measurement procedures?”. Interview 
data was captured by note - taking and digital recording that was transcribed verbatim in order to 
develop a comprehensive database of all four cases. Informal field notes were taken that included 
secondary data complimented with desktop research and follow-up conversations with project 
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members. For all four cases the variety of different forms of data allowed for triangulation 
between self-report and official documents and fits the tradition of critical realism.  
The cross case data analysis was based on the structure provided by the key motivation 
drivers of Rose & Manley (2011). This means that apart from a comparison of the contractual 
agreements and case characteristics, the cases were compared on the contextual drivers of 
incentive motivation. The contextual drivers relating to case study characteristics are as follows: 
A) Contract assumptions and selection phase: 
• Incentive goal opportunities: the range of goals covering key project priorities.  
• Design involvement: the involvement of project parties, particularly the contractor, in the 
design process 
• Risk allocation: how design and construction risk is allocated under the base contract. 
• Value-driven tender: the nature of the tender selection process in promoting ‘value’ selection 
• Future work: project stakeholder opportunities for future work 
B) Execution and evaluation of contract performance:  
• Reward distribution: structure of incentive reward distribution on offer.  
• Incentive flexibility: the ability of the mechanism to adapt incentive design to suit changes in 
the project environment. 
• Relationship workshops: encouraging the formation of strong project relationship and 
establishment of trust.  
Since construction in the Dutch cases is still in progress, the research results of the Execution 
and evaluation phase of the Dutch cases are based on the preliminary results and expectations as 
expressed during the interviews.  
Each case project was treated as an independent study which was subsequently subjected 
to cross-case analysis. Throughout data analysis and reporting the authors were frequently cross 
referenced between the interpretation and the original data. They regularly contacted each other 
to discuss the framework and share a common understanding about the cases and its context. 
This process can be characterized as ex ante use of theory in qualitative research (Andersen and 
Kragh 2010). The general aim of this approach is ‘not to build consensus aiming diverging 
theoretical perspectives but rather to use their divergences as vantage points for creating new 
insights’ (Andersen and Kragh 2010: 53). Since we were especially interested in commonalities 
and differences between the four cases and two countries, this approach appeared to suit our 
study.  
SUMMARY OF CASES 
The following provides a summary of each of the four case studies. Highway package F 
(D1) and Highway A12 (D2) were civil infrastructure projects delivered in the Netherlands, 
while Brisbane Magistrates Courts project (A1) and the Lyell McEwin Health Redevelopment 
project (A2) where social infrastructure (building) projects delivered in Australia. Table 1 
provides an overview on the most important characteristics of each of the four cases. 
 
Table 1: Summary of case projects 
 
Code A1 A2 D1 D2 
Project title Brisbane 
Magistrates Courts 
project  
Lyell McEwin Health 
Redevelopment 
project  
Highway package F Highway A12  
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Context Australia Australia The Netherlands  The Netherlands  
Project type Large scale new 
court complex 
construction 
Large scale hospital 
redevelopment 
Large scale road 
maintenance on 
three trajectories  
Reconstruction and 
extension highway 
trajectory  
Contractual 
agreement 
Managing 
Contractor; Design 
and Construction 
Management 
Managing 
Contractor; 
Construction 
Management 
Design & Construct Design, Build, Finance, 
Maintain 
Project budget AUS$135.5 
million 
AUS$91.2 million €108,5 million  €1.500 million 
Procurement 
procedure 
Single stage 
Competitive: non 
price criteria 70% 
Two stage 
Competitive: non 
price 60% 
Best Value 
Procurement - non 
price criteria 70% 
Competitive dialogue – 
neutralized cash value 
registration 
Start & 
Completion date 
March 2002 – 
November 2004 
February 2001- May 
2005 
June 2010 - May 
2012 
Construction: January 
2011 – December 
2015;  Maintenance 
2016-2036 
Final client cost $135.5 million 
(GCS) 
Approximately 4% 
below budget. 
Not yet known. Still under 
construction. 
 
Brisbane Magistrates Courts project (A1) 
The Brisbane Magistrates Court project was a large Australian government project with a 
construction cost of AUS$135.5 million (€ 97 million). The iconic building project was deemed 
high risk from the outset, combining a unique and complex design with high level of public 
scrutiny over project outcomes. The general procurement approach was a Managing Contractor – 
Design and Construction Management – Guaranteed Construction Sum (or ‘GCS’) arrangement. 
This form of procurement was chosen by the client as it allowed a high degree of certainty on 
end-costs through the appointed GCS. It also allowed the client significant control over design 
and quality as they were involved in the design process during conceptual planning, schematic 
design and design development and documentation stages. The project included a performance-
based financial incentive mechanism of an incremental allocation from an incentive pool of 
AUS$1.6 million built into the original project budget. The incentive offer was based on the 
completion of specific stretched-scope construction goals outside the mandatory scope of the 
contract. The project team managed to deliver the project on time and within client budget, 
meeting quality and functionality requirements. However, they failed to achieve the above 
‘stretched-scope’ goals that were required for the team to receive any of the financial incentive 
pool.  
Lyell McEwin Health Redevelopment project (A2) 
The project was a large Australian government acute care hospital redevelopment with a 
design and construction cost of AUS$91.2 million (€65 million). This redevelopment was in 
response to a review of the existing facilities that were identified as not meeting their operational 
requirements and health service delivery models. This project included the demolition of much 
of the outdated infrastructure and replacement of all hospital wards. The project was undertaken 
via a Managing Contractor – Construction Management contract. The selected procurement 
approach allowed the client to control design and construction and manage construction costs 
through variation payments. However, under this form, the client took on the majority of cost 
overrun and design discrepancy risks. A key feature of the management strategy for the project 
was the abolition of the traditional hierarchical structure in favor of a ‘round table’ approach, 
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intended to promote honesty and openness in project meetings between the major parties. The 
incentive mechanism involved a capped financial incentive pool of AUS$1.5 million was offered 
by the client and financed through the preservation of contingency amounts, which linked the 
client’s objectives to the cost outcomes on the project.  
Highway package F (D1) 
Highway package F is part of a portfolio of infrastructure projects meant to stimulate the 
Dutch economy. In this case the ‘express law’ made it possible to consult the market about the 
interest in specific renovation projects to improve the condition of the Dutch highway network 
and start the tender before the final permits were granted. This led to a collection of projects of 
which some were procured in an innovative way by applying Best Value Procurement. One of 
these projects is Package F, which includes adaptations to two trajectories of the A12 highway 
on the west part of the west-east corridor in the Netherlands and one trajectory on the A2 
Highway which runs from north to west,. The project was awarded based on a D&C contract 
with a total budget of €108,5 million (AUS$121 million). Most of the incentive mechanisms 
focused on a low price corrected by the potential traffic flows. An additional speedy delivery 
bonus also part of the incentive structure but this appeared to be not very influential on the final 
bids. After awarding the contract, on both the client and the contractor’s side a full project team 
was operational to execute the project. The team of the client mainly focused on facilitating the 
contractor in providing data about the asset conditions and assessing progress of the project by 
external inspection. So far (June 2012) the project is running on schedule. 
Highway A12 (D2)  
The Highway A12 project concerns part of the main traffic corridors of the Netherlands 
from the main ports (Airport Schiphol and the Harbour of Rotterdam) to the eastern part of the 
country, connecting Germany and other European countries. The project consists of 
reconstruction and capacity extension of the trajectory Utrecht-Lunetten-Veenendaal in the 
middle of the corridor, 30 kilometers of highway in total. The project contains as a DBFM 
contract in which the design, realization, maintenance and finances for the next 20 years has to 
executed by the contractor. The goals of the project are improving the traffic flow, limiting the 
nuisance for the local residents and a speedy availability of the infrastructure. Part of the project 
belongs to measures taken by the Dutch government to boost the economy in 2009 due economic 
crisis. Total budget is €1.500 Million (AUS$1.690 million). Currently a full project team on both 
the client and the contractor’s side is operational to execute the project. The project is still under 
construction but preliminary results indicate a delivery far ahead of schedule.  
RESULTS 
Summary of case results 
Table 2 presents a summary of case results in relation to the contextual drivers seen to impact on 
the effectiveness of the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms (Rose, 2008). 
Contextual drivers are now discussed in detail in relation to the four case studies and compared. 
Case study discussion is split between contextual drivers that are established at the early in an 
infrastructure project – or what we define as the contract assumptions and selection phase -, and 
context drivers that are more predominant during project delivery, or the execution and 
evaluation of contract performance phase. This provided the authors the ability to dissect the data 
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and compare results relating to specific project stages, particularly as the Netherlands projects 
are still under construction and part of the data is yet to emerge. 
 
Table 2: Summary of case results   
 
Key contextual 
driver/ project  
A1 A2 D1 D2 
Contract assumptions and selection phase: 
Incentive goal 
opportunities 
(multiple goals) 
Single ‘stretched 
scope’ goal. 
Multiple goal 
opportunities 
according to 
Ecological Sustainable 
Development (ESD), 
community relations, 
training and program 
benchmarks 
During BVP 
procedure interviews 
with key persons, 
contractors were able 
to adjust their 
contributions during 
the tender. 
Competitive dialogue 
about list of identified 
risks and preferred 
success factors of the 
client. 
Risk allocation 
(influence on 
share in 
construction 
risks) 
All design and 
construction risk 
allocated to 
managing contractor 
under GCS 
arrangement 
Design risk allocated 
to client. Construction 
risk shared by client 
and contractor. 
Almost all risks were 
taken by the 
contractor after 
shared risk allocation 
process.  
Almost all were taken 
by the contractor after 
discussion in CD 
procedure. 
Value-driven 
tender (selection 
based on price 
and non-price 
criteria) 
Price 30%, non-
price 70%: proven 
ability; resource 
strategy; project 
methodology; 
relationship 
management; 
community liaison. 
Two-stage tender 
evaluation process: 
panel judgment. 
Two-stage tender 
evaluation process: 1st 
stage price negotiation 
= 40%, second stage 
non-price 60%: past 
performance, 
teamwork 
Price 30%, Non-
price; risks, 
opportunities, 
planning, capabilities 
key persons - partly 
judged by expert 
panel. 
Performance based 
contract on traffic flow 
during construction 
and maintenance. 
Virtual value of price, 
risks and non-taken 
risks – partly judged 
by expert panel. 
Design 
involvement (in 
early stage of 
project) 
Managing 
Contractor 
appointed early to 
build GCS and 
contribute to design 
development 
Managing Contractor 
and major 
subcontractors 
appointed under two 
stage arrangement 
directly to client from 
schematic design  
D&B contract with 
contractor, 
guaranteed 
construction sum 
determined by 
concept design 
during tenders.  
DBFM contract, 
calculations about 
traffic flows, 
sustainability and 
stakeholder 
inconvenience part of 
the tender process.  
Future work 
(possibility for 
future works) 
Past performance 
system - successful 
delivery of iconic 
project seen to 
directly improve 
opportunities for 
future government 
work.  
Client offer for 
managing contractor 
and key consultants to 
be reappointed for 
ongoing project stages 
if they achieve high 
performance 
Limited competition; 
selection 
requirements did not 
exclude certain 
parties. Currently 
implementing past 
performance system.  
No actual need for past 
performance since 
only few parties in the 
market that quality for 
large projects. 
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Execution and evaluation of contract performance:  
Reward 
distribution 
(influence on 
reward 
allocation, self-
assessment) 
Exponential 
payment of 
incentive reward 
based on completion 
of stretched-scope 
construction goals. 
Contractor reward 
only. 
Capped financial 
incentive pool of 
AUS$1.5 million 
financed through the 
preservation of 
contingency amounts. 
Pool allocated 
according to 
performance in ESD, 
community relations, 
training and program 
performance based on 
fee proportion 
Shared risk fund: 
25% of remainder is 
for contractor. 
Contractor 
responsible for 
assessment reports. 
This enables trust 
between client and 
contractor.  
CD procedure resulted 
in agreed allocation of 
risks and reward 
scheme during 
construction. 
Maintenance: yearly 
fee based on traffic 
flows 
Incentive 
flexibility 
(possibility to                     
adjust after 
tender) 
Minimum flexibility Flexible through 
consensual agreement 
Minimum flexibility 
after final bid 
Joint agreement on 
flexibility within 
contractual terms 
Relationship 
workshops 
(formal and 
informal 
workshops and 
reviews) 
Initial relationship 
workshops and 
relationship 
management 
requirements as a 
part of project 
agreements. 
Relationship 
consultant appointed to 
conduct relationship 
workshops. Ongoing 
relationship 
monitoring in a project 
workgroups defined as 
a project objective. 
Procurement method 
included team based 
selection via 
interviews with key 
persons. 
Performance based 
contract informing 
the client about 
progress based on 
external reviews. 
Competitive dialogue 
during selection 
increased common 
understanding. Project 
start up, regular 
project meetings and 
open communication 
via functional and 
technical requirements  
 
Results on selection phase and contract assumptions  
Incentive goal opportunities 
Management literature emphasizes the importance to ‘balance’ incentive goal parameters 
to prevent overemphasis on particular goals, where setting multiple goals and incentive reward 
levels ensure that goals remain achievable and credit is given for partial success. According to 
the Australian case project results, A1 had a single incentive goal, while A2 had a wide range of 
performance goals. The results from A1 indicated project participants felt that the single 
stretched-scope goal was too restricted, and did not take account of their performance in the key 
project priority areas. For example, according to the contractor representative on the project, the 
single incentive goal “wasn’t enough to really measure the achievements on the project. I think if 
we had of been offered more of a reward in other areas it could have pushed us further.” The 
perceived injustice in the development of the goals early in the project resulted in its failure. 
Again, this was opposite in A2, where multiple incentive goals gave the project participants 
considerable control over their performance, as there was a wide range of opportunities to secure 
the financial incentive. 
In both project D1 and D2 there were opportunities during the selection phase for the 
contractors to share their plans and goals with the client. The Best Value Procurement method of 
project D1 included interviews with key persons. These interviews provided the basis for the 
performance based contracts. In D1 the tender candidates especially expressed a need for more 
clarification on the award criteria and actual aim of the client for the project, e.g. sustainability or 
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continuous traffic flows. In the competitive dialogue of case D2, the list of predetermined risks 
and success measures was discussed in detail between the client and the contractor before the 
contractors offered their final bids. This enables both parties to take indistinctness about the 
project goals out of the air in a relative early phase of the project and improved the sensemaking 
processes between the client and the contractor. According to the contract manager this 
eventually “led to a good feeling about the submitted bids”. 
Design involvement 
A major difference between the Netherlands civil and Australian building case projects 
was the greater emphasis on the design stage in building projects. As such, participants involved 
in the building projects placed much greater emphasis on the involvement of the contractor and 
key subcontractors in the design stage, as design discrepancy risks can be potentially higher in 
building projects in comparison to civil road projects. In road infrastructure it is possible to 
define a relatively simple performance measurement system or parameters for the success of 
qualitative aspects, e.g. the traffic loss hours or amount of failures, since the safety and technical 
requirements are pretty much pre-defined. In architecture everything is adopted to its context.  
According to the results from project A2, the involvement of the managing contractor and 
key subcontractors in design development was seen to improve the project team’s ability to 
manage the integration of design and construction by providing buildability advice. According to 
the project client this assisted the team to “find building smarts that would improve the value of 
the project - and gave ‘a good indication of what [the team] were aiming for in terms of cost 
reduction”. Project A2 also uniquely involved key subcontractors in the design stage, which was 
seen to improve the managing contractor’s effectiveness in identifying value-added design 
options. On the other hand, project A1 was plagued with quality of documentation issues that 
were attributed to late contractor involvement in design. These issues may have been resolved if 
the managing contractor had been involved in design earlier, minimizing the level of design 
rework required during design documentation.  
Project D2 involved competitive dialog during the selection phase, encouraging the 
discussion of concept designs with the client and award based on the expected traffic flows, 
sustainability and level of stakeholder inconvenience. This opened up the discussion about 
different construction methods with innovative solutions to increase the construction speed. The 
contract manager of the client indicated that “most of the questions related to the qualitative 
elements instead of the bolt and nuts” which shows a different focus on the bidders. Project D1 
was awarded based on a D&B contract, which included only a small portion of design and a lot 
of construction because of the large share of maintenance activities. However, due to innovation 
in the design of the construction processes (e.g. permit permission, adjusted design solutions) it 
was possible to accelerate the delivery of the project. In this sense, the procurement method 
opened up the possibilities to include the design in the construction in both cases, which is quite 
unique in economic infrastructure projects.  
Risk allocation 
In all cases the allocation of risk under contract arrangements impacted on the 
implementation of the incentive mechanisms. In case A1, the managing contractor took on a 
greater share of construction cost risk in comparison to A2 under different contract forms. 
According to the participants involved in project A2, the client’s willingness to share 
construction cost risk was seen to improve the managing contractors’ ability to achieve the 
incentive goals, as they were less likely to be focused on their own financial liabilities, and more 
likely to perceive the client behavior as fair. For example, the managing contractor perceived the 
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client’s willingness to share construction risk “broke down the ‘us versus them’ attitude which is 
prevalent in [traditional] contracts and focused our joint attention on achieving the project 
goals.” On the other hand, the A1 project participants acknowledged that the contractor resorted 
to a self protective position due to their high risk liability, partly resulting in an unwillingness to 
pursue the stretched scope incentive goals. 
In the tender phase of D2 a list of previously identified risks and opportunities were made 
available. According to the project leader the contractors could thus decide for themselves which 
of these risks were to be part of their job description. After submission of the final bids it 
appeared that most of the contractors “took most of the risks”. This was probably due to the 
competition in the market and the expectation that other contractors would also allocate these 
risks towards themselves. Project D1 included a shared risk fund. In case of unexpected events, 
the contractor was allowed to solve the problems based on actual costs +5% cost markup. The 
contractor was entitled to 25% of the remainder of this fund after delivery of the project. This 
way the contractor was stimulated to create preventive measures in the early phase of the project 
that would leave the risk fund untouched, which actually happened. Preliminary results indicate 
that this risk fund contributed to the project culture in which not every detail and possible 
additional costs are discussed. Yet, in D2 the client project leader indicated that so far hardly any 
unforeseen costs have been filed to “apparently you don’t need a shared risk fund if the 
arrangements are just”.  
Value-driven tender 
All case projects involved some form of non-price criteria that encouraged selection 
based on value in comparison to price alone. Both A1 and A2 had relatively high non-price 
proponents, with project A1 affording a 30% price and 70% non-price split, and project A2 with 
a two-stage 40% price and 60% non-price split. Non price criteria included proven past 
performance and ability; resource strategy; project methodology; commitment to relationship 
management; and community consultation. According to both project A1 and A2 results, the 
selection of project participants based on their ability to add value to the project (rather than the 
traditional price-focused tender selection) increased the project participants’ expectations that 
incentive goals could be achieved, promoting commitment. It was also seen to encourage a 
willingness to align with the team objectives and meet the client expectations by which they 
were selected.  
In the Netherlands cases, both D1 and D2 were awarded based on the Economically Most 
Advantageous Tender principle. In D1 the price/quality ration was 30/70, in which the quality 
included the allocated risks, the offered opportunities, the planning, and the capabilities key 
persons as tested during an interview. Within the tender process of project D1 an incentive 
mechanism successfully prevented the contractor from offering an unrealistic price. In case the 
target price differed more than 5% from the final fixed price, this was deducted from the shared 
risk fund. No deviations meant a ‘no claim’ bonus of 2.5%. An internal comparison of project 
D1 with 9 other projects showed the most of the winners scored first or second in rank on quality 
(traffic flow, planning). They also found that the price - quality ration should be equal or more 
towards quality to prevent opportunistic behavior and make value-driven tenders effective. In D2 
the contracts were awarded based on the virtual value of the price and risk allocation. This 
required the judgment of expert since not all aspects were quantified easily. Not all judgments 
were made by this expert panel since “previous experiences showed that the bidders were a bit 
nervous about the qualitative aspects of this judgment” (project leader client). The results of D2 
indicate that during the competitive dialogue the contractors assigned more value to the informal 
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conversations than the formal conversations. This shows the relevance of information contacts in 
building a successful relationship between client and contractor. 
Future work 
The results from the Australian case projects identified that due to a highly competitive 
local building construction market the desire to uphold and improve reputation, so as to increase 
future commercial opportunities, was a strong motivator to pursue incentive goals. This was 
particularly relevant to Australian government projects, where state governments are major 
repeat clients. It is likely that the desire to strengthen reputation with these clients would be 
stronger than with clients who are less likely to provide further work opportunities. The strength 
of this driver was particularly evident in the project outcomes for project A2, where the key 
project participants were offered the opportunity to be reappointed to ongoing stages of the 
hospital redevelopment program if they achieved high performance. This strongly intensified the 
desire to achieve the incentive targets outside the financial reward on offer where the contractor 
was “driven to maintain the good relationship with the government client so [they] would be 
looked on favorably in future projects…as valued reward outside the [financial] incentives.” 
Project D1 and D2 were both relatively large highway infrastructure projects as part of 
the governmental strategy to support the construction industry in surviving the credit crunch. 
Since the Dutch economic infrastructure market has only a limited amount of competent players 
in this segment, pre-selection of the contractors usually focuses on financial requirements to 
ensure the business case.  So in D1 and D2 the selection requirements did not lead to exclusion 
of certain parties. A comparative study between the other projects that belonged to the portfolio 
which included D1 did show that the larger contractors had won more tenders than specific 
combinations of small contractors. A need still exists to offer contractors that outreach other 
contractors increased chances of winning a tender. Therefore several infrastructure providers in 
the Netherlands are currently implementing past performance system to make it possible. This 
would enhance a collaborative environment between client and contractor.  
Results on execution phase and evaluation of contract performance  
Incentive flexibility 
Due to the often high level of uncertainty and complexity within large infrastructure 
projects, it is difficult to predict, at the commencement of the project, the events that will occur 
during delivery that may alter project outcomes. Therefore, project design features should remain 
relatively flexible to meet changing project circumstances. This sentiment can also apply to 
incentive mechanisms where it may be important to adjust reward structures at the post contract 
stages in order to achieve performance targets when faced with uncertainty.  
The Australia research results emphasized the importance that goals and measurement 
processes should be as flexible as possible to ensure that unforeseen events do not render the 
incentive measurement benchmarks unattainable. This occurred in Case A1, where the ‘stretched 
scope’ goals were not pursued because of the financial pressure faced by the managing 
contractor under the GCS arrangement. This was opposite in Case A2, where the incentive goals 
were adjusted to align with emerging project priorities resulting in higher performance by the 
end of the project.  
Since the Dutch cases were still in the construction phase, the results of the incentive 
structure are not fully available yet. However, a preliminary evaluation of the tender procedure 
of D1 showed that most of the costs incentives were reached without further adjustments. Next 
that that only limited additional costs were needed to complete the project. In D2 the contractor 
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decided to make use of the possibility to deliver the road earlier as planned and thus saving 
money by early payment. The client project leader indicated that during the construction “some 
issues that officially might not have been part of the contractual agreements were solved in 
consultation with the contractor”. This kind of behavior caused a certain kind of flexibility in the 
contractual arrangements which supported the process of “searching for win-win situations” 
within the contractual boundaries.    
Reward distribution 
In relation to reward distribution A2 project results suggested that the project participants 
valued the client’s decision to allow the project team to decide how the incentive amount would 
be distributed. It was jointly decided that the bonus pool incentive would be distributed 
according to fee proportions as the contractor was remunerated under a ‘construction 
management’ fee arrangement. According to a project consultant representative, “this was a fair 
way to [distribute the reward] and let the team decide how it would be allocated [to] the 
managing contractor, consultants and key subcontractors based on fee percentages.” On the other 
hand, A1 only offered the incentive reward to the managing contractor to the disappointment of 
consultants and key subcontractors who were seen to contribute to pursuing the stretched scope 
incentive goals. The research results suggest the financial incentive distribution plan should be 
equitable in how it rewards the major parties who contribute to the incentive goal performance 
outcome, including consultants and subcontractors. 
Both Dutch cases used the measure of self-assessment to agree upon the distribution of 
the rewards. This meant that the contractors had to take care of their own inspections of the work 
and invite third parties to provide second opinions about specific additional measures that could 
require additional funds. In D1 the shared risk fund allowed the contractor to “pick their battles” 
with the client. The preliminary results indicate that this way of working stimulated the 
contractor to only address the serious issues that arose. The contract manager indicated that 
compared to traditional projects not much activities had to be performed that were out of the 
project scope and requiring additional funds. For D2 so far no real issues have risen about 
performances and payments. In case deviations appeared to occur, these were openly discussed 
during the regular meetings. The final outcomes were filed in management system that is also 
used for the performance measurements.    
Relationship workshops 
Although each case project had varying relationship development processes, it was 
evident from projects A1 and A2, the initial relationship workshop and informal relationship 
monitoring induced commitment towards achieving shared incentive goals, encouraged 
collaboration and promoted trust. Specifically, the procurement approach in A2 placed greater 
emphasis on the development of the project relationship, with more intensive relationship 
workshops than in A1 (which had only one relationship meeting after the managing contractor 
was engaged). The comparisons between these projects suggest that the greater the level of team 
building developed through ongoing relationship workshops, the greater the willingness of 
participants to pursue incentive goals. 
In D1 the composition of the contractor team was part of the tender bid. The Dutch client 
applied Best Value Procurement method comprised interviews with the future project leader and 
main team members. The contractual agreements included a clause about continuous 
commitment of these team members during the complete project. This method can be considered 
as an early relationship workshop. Additionally, the first six months after award of the contract 
were spent on collaborative design activities and the project aims were extensively discussed 
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during a Project Start Up session. Hence, the results of an evaluation report indicated that the 
close contact with the contractor decreased after the tender phase. Therefore it can be concluded 
that more workshops in the early execution phase and regular formal assessments would have 
been beneficial. In D2 the client organized a Project Start Up to get the contractor acquainted 
with the culture and procedures of the client organization. Especially in the beginning the client 
project manager indicated that they tried to “teach them to understand our environment and show 
our trust in their capabilities and intentions”. Because D2 is still under construction the official 
effects of the interactive procurement method are not available yet. However, preliminary results 
indicate that delivery will be four months ahead of schedule, additionally to the 1,5 years that 
were accomplished during the tender.  
CONCLUSION  
The effectiveness of an incentive mechanism to promote the achievement of shared goals 
is highly sensitive to the context in which it is applied, particularly in complex social 
environments like construction projects. Thus, effective incentive design requires a clear 
understanding of the impact of different delivery strategies and environmental contexts on 
incentive goal motivation. Drawing on the results of two Australian social infrastructure 
(building) case projects and two civil infrastructure projects from the Netherlands, differences 
and similarities in key contextual drivers were explored. It was identified that despite significant 
differences in the project characteristics across the two countries, results indicate they experience 
similar contextual drivers impacting on the incentive effectiveness.  
Of note, high value was placed on equitable contract risk allocation in support of the 
incentive and the quality of project relationships promoted by relationship workshops and 
interaction during and after the selection process. These findings indicate that the development of 
project relationships (mediated through formal governance mechanisms) has a major impact on 
the success of incentives, despite differences in project characteristics. All cases were value 
driven tenders in which price was to be of lower importance than non-price criteria, which 
enabled the use of performance based incentive mechanisms. In all cases, the organizational 
structure aimed at encouraging the formation of trust across organizational boundaries and open 
communication about issues that emerged from the dynamics of construction.  
On the other hand, three contextual drivers were seen to be different across the Australian 
and Dutch contexts. They were: 1) the opportunities for future work, 2) design involvement, and 
3) incentive flexibility. This was primarily related to the differences between the two sets of 
projects. Firstly, future work opportunities were identified to be a more powerful driver in the 
Australian building context due to a highly competitive building construction market in 
comparison to the Dutch market, who have limited amount of players in road construction. This 
means that the Dutch client recently decided to decrease the pre-selection requirements. It is 
interesting to note that the Dutch client is currently developing a past performance system to 
enhance collaboration and trust with their contract parties for all infrastructure projects (road, rail 
and real estate).  
Secondly, the impact of design involvement and incentive flexibility seems to be more 
pronounced in the Australian building case projects in comparison to the Dutch road construction 
case projects. This may be due to a higher level of design complexity in building construction, 
introducing higher design and performance discrepancy risks. Similarly, in civil projects 
architectural design aspects are less prominent than in building projects, which also show in the 
character of the incentive schemes and goal opportunities implemented across the two sets of 
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case projects. Yet, the increase of software issues (traffic management, tunnel safety etc.) in 
infrastructure project may give reason for more incentive flexibility and design focus.  
So although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two 
sets of diverse case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore incentive systems across 
different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research. Despite this contribution, 
future research is required to further explore the causal relationships between incentive outcomes 
and project related and contextual characteristics, including cultural differences across cases. 
This collaborative research is planned by the authors and is expected to provide greater clarity on 
the nature of incentive drivers across broadly different contexts, building upon the results 
presented in this paper. 
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